From “The Defense Monitor” – Center for Defense Information – Washington, DC

Tel: 202-332-0600

Technological Challenges in

National Missile Defense

By Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)

Chief of Research

The National Missile Defense (NMD) program is what the Pentagon calls a "system of systems." In NMD, necessary functions are distributed to different sites over vast distances linked by high speed data communications.

The NMD Systems

The NMD complex currently planned has six distinct parts, all of which must perform perfectly if the system is to succeed. These elements are:

1) The initial launch detection and tracking system that consists of the satellites of the Defense Support Program (DSP). The satellites are scheduled to be replaced starting in 2006 or 2007 by the Spaced Based InfraRed System-High (SBIRS-High) constellation of five (plus one in reserve) geosynchronous satellites.

NMD Engagement

Sequence

Click image to enlarge

2) Five ground-based early warning radars (including one each in the UK and Greenland) that receive the initial tracking data from DSP or SBIRS-High through the system's command and control network. These ultra-high frequency radars project the flight "envelope" of the hostile missile's trajectory. The five existing radars are to be upgraded to enhance their tracking capability, which in turn will improve the data available to plot intercept points.

3) Four but possibly as many as nine (including one each in the UK, Greenland, and South Korea) X-band (high frequency, short wavelength) radars whose function is to discriminate between incoming real warheads and decoys. The first of these for the NMD system is to be built on Shemya Island in the western Aleutian Islands of Alaska.

4) Interceptor booster, a modified three stage commercial "off-the-shelf" very fast rocket which carries the exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) to close proximity of the planned intercept point. While in flight the EKV receives updated information on the changing location of the incoming missile and warheads/decoys and passes this information to the booster until separation.

5) Exoatmospheric kill vehicle, whose on-board computer processes updates on the location of the hostile missile after the EKV has separated from the booster. The EKV has a combined optical and infrared (multiple waveband) sensor on board through which it acquires, tracks, and discriminates its target. Using small thrusters, the EKV, which weighs 130 pounds and is 51 inches long, performs terminal maneuvers enabling it to strike the target and destroy it by kinetic energy. The combined closing speed of the target and the interceptor is some 15,000 miles per hour.

6) The Battle Management, Command, Control, and Communications (BMC3) network, the heart of NMD. It links the separate elements, receiving data; analyzing parameters such as speed, trajectory, and impact point of hostile warheads; calculates the optimum intercept point; cues and fires the interceptor; provides updated information to the booster and EKV; and assesses success and failure of the intercept and, if the latter, repeats the process with one or more additional interceptors. A critical sub-element of BMC3 is the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS) through which information is sent to the interceptor as it flies toward the target. Five locations have been designated for six to twelve equipment sets, but more may be required.

A seventh element, a constellation of 24 low orbit SBIRS satellites that will improve launch detection and warhead-decoy discrimination, is to be added later. But in 1999 the Air Force canceled a $832 million contract to test models of SBIRS-Low because of software and sensor problems. The service now plans that the first 6 of the 24 satellites lofted into space in 2006 or 2007 will be "experimental." (See Enclosure 1, "Notional Deployment Architectures" for the proposed locations of the components of each currently planned stage of NMD development.)

The Current Flight Test Record

In addition to a number of static ground tests of various components, there have been six actual Integrated Flight Tests (IFTs) since 1998.

1) IFT 1 (April 1998): The interceptor was incorrectly programmed and failed to lift off the launch pad.

2) IFT 1A (June 1998): A "fly-by" test to determine if the EKV could discriminate between decoys and target warheads. According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), nine decoys and one warhead were included in this test of the Boeing/TRW EKV, which BMDO judged a success. This finding has been disputed (see "Discrimination" below).

3) IFT 2 (April 1999): Another fly-by test using an EKV built by Raytheon. Again, nine decoys and one warhead were used, and again BMDO declared the test successful.

4) IFT 3 (October 2, 1999): After two delays, this first attempt to achieve actual intercept of the target by the EKV finally occurred. Only one warhead and one decoy were used. BMDO defines this configuration as the one that the Capability 1 NMD will be facing in 2005. No actual data derived from the sensors were sent to the interceptor during the test. Initially, the EKV homed in on the decoy, detecting the warhead only at the last moment and hitting it.

5) IFT 4 (January 18, 2000): In this test programmed information was relayed from the launch detection system through the BMC3 network to the intercept booster. Six seconds before planned impact the infrared sensor on the EKV malfunctioned due to a blockage in the sensor's cooling system and the EKV missed the target.

6) IFT 5 (July 7, 2000): For this test, also delayed twice, the IFICS of the BMC3 network was to provide guidance and final pointer information to the EKV after it had left the booster. The EKV failed to separate from the booster and its sensors were never activated. Another "low tech" failure occurred when the Mylar balloon decoy on the target rocket did not inflate. However, BMDO claimed that a prototype X-band radar at the test interceptor launch location "discriminated the mock warhead from all other objects, including the debris from an improperly inflated decoy balloon."

Additional Planned Tests

Given past failures, the schedule for future tests is fluid. Tests that are particularly critical are:

IFT 6 (January 2001): This is the back-up to IFT 5 in the event that test was so inconclusive that little or no useful data was obtained. Originally, it was set for October in order to provide one more test before the anticipated presidential decision on whether to proceed with the system as configured.

FT 8 (2001): For the first time an operational ground based interceptor booster rather than a surrogate booster will be tested.

IFT 13 (2003): This will be the first test of a full scale production ground based interceptor (booster and EKV). This date must now be considered highly questionable.

In total, some 21 in-flight tests (including the two fly-bys) are scheduled before the 2005 deployment, but only 11 are scheduled to occur before the deployment decision in 2003.

With the setback caused by the failure of IFT 5, the Pentagon has delayed its planned summer Decision Readiness Review by Secretary of Defense William Cohen at least into September. This in turn will delay the Secretary's recommendation to the President on whether to proceed with deployment.

The Challenges

Of the four criteria President Clinton said would guide his decision on proceeding with an NMD system-threat, cost, technological maturity, and arms control impacts-technology is the controlling variable. U.S. political considerations have already "substantiated" the threat, with only the date at which North Korea achieves an operational long-range missile capability in question. (In 1994 the U.S. intelligence community estimated North Korea would test its Taepo-Dong 2 missile sometime in the mid to late 1990s; it has yet to be tested.) With the budget surpluses, only the ability of BMDO to apply the money being allocated seems to be preventing the addition of even larger sums. The Administration has said that should Russia not agree to modify the ABM Treaty, the United States will abrogate the Treaty in order to proceed with NMD deployment.

Technology is indeed proving to be a brake of sorts, and this even though the Pentagon changed from two to one the number of successful intercepts needed to recommend to the President that he approve deployment.

There is also an object lesson in terms of the causes of the failures. They have not been "rocket science" but mundane things: failure of the interceptor to fire because it was incorrectly programmed; a blockage in the cooling system for the infrared sensor on the EKV; the failure of the EKV to separate from the booster, a "staging" sequence used thousands of times since the beginning of the U.S. space program. Even the October 2, 1999 hit was not "clean" in that the EKV first detected and homed on the balloon decoy and only then found the mock warhead.

Discrimination: The Real Showstopper

"Discrimination"-the ability to distinguish real warheads from decoys-seems to be the most complex and controversial technological hurdle. The fundamental realities are twofold. First, the system has to confront an incoming missile whose purpose is to fool the interceptor into going after one of many relatively sophisticated decoys. Second, the general performance characteristics of the U.S. EKV-its sensor array and communications links-are known, which can make the task of fooling the EKV easier.

The current NMD system is focused on mid-course intercept of the incoming threat, which is generally predicted to be a nuclear warhead. But should the hostile missile's payload consist of bomblets filled with biological or chemical agents, there would be too many "warheads" for the NMD defender to take out.

Even with a nuclear warhead, the discrimination task is formidable. The warhead could be enclosed in a Mylar balloon and be accompanied by a number of similar but empty balloons. Dr. Theodore Postol, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, strongly believes that in the almost complete vacuum of space the EKV would be incapable of distinguishing the real warhead from a fake. The EKV "sees" these objects only as light points and evaluates their "size, temperature, surface materials, and orientation in space." Dr. Postol says that the full data collected from the 10 object fly-by test (IFT 1A) showed that the "changing spatial orientation of the decoys and warheads. . . was nearly the same" and "fluctuated in a varied and totally unpredictable way." Thus there is "no fluctuating feature. . . that could be used to distinguish one object from the other." And Dr. Postol says that the EKV sensors, which are programmed to measure fluctuations in the intensity of light, first identified a partially inflated balloon as the target and then two other "benign" objects that were brighter than the actual mock warhead. Yet because of the combined closing speed of 15,000 miles per hour (approximately 4 miles per second), the EKV must make the correct choice relatively early. The following indicates how hard this may be, according to Dr. Postol:

At 625 miles (1,000 kilometers) distance the EKV sensors have a resolution of between 488-975 feet (150-300 meters).

At just over 6 miles out (10 kilometers) the resolution is still only 4.9-9.8 feet (1.5 to 3 meters).

A warhead similar to the Mark 12A used on U.S. Minuteman missiles is only 6 feet (1.83 meters) long with a base of 22 inches.

At 2-4.5 miles (3-6 kilometers) separation distance, the EKV has under a half second to maneuver before impact.

BMDO refutes Dr. Postol's analysis as it does the judgment that it cut the number of decoys to four and then to one for the intercept attempts in order to improve the chances for successful discrimination. (Dr. Philip Coyle, head of the Pentagon's Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, who is himself a frequent critic of NMD, has supported their denials that the early tests had been rigged.)

Dr. Postol is not the only expert who believes the Pentagon has not been forthcoming with information. Michael Munn, retired Lockheed chief scientist who worked on NMD and headed the teams that scored the hit-to-kill "successes" in 1984 and 1991,1 recently said: "Discrimination looks easy when you do it on paper. But you get up there and you never see what you expect-the data never agree with the predictions. The only way to make it [the testing] work is to dumb it down. There's no other way."

General Ronald Kadish, the current Director of BMDO, relies on the most recent "Welch Report" to buttress his position that the best approach to NMD development is an incremental one: although "design discrimination capabilities are adequate to meet the defined C-1 [Capability 1] threat. . . more advanced decoy suites are likely to escalate the discrimination challenge" [emphasis added]. General Kadish told the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 29, 2000 that "should we choose to add the additional sophistication" the EKV can handle more sophisticated decoys.

General Kadish did acknowledge that the NMD program is on a high risk schedule as it has compressed the normal DoD acquisition cycle from the usual 15 or more years to 8 (1997-2005). But he also believes, in quoting the latest Welch Report, that "the technical capability is available to develop and field the limited system to meet the defined C-1 threat" consisting of unsophisticated countermeasures [emphasis added]. Considering that the "hit-to-kill" approach leaves no room for error, many regard this "defined" threat as defining away the problem.

Sea-Based Boost Phase NMD

Since the discrimination problem seems the most contentious, many analysts, including former Secretaries of Defense John Deutch and Harold Brown and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John White, are pushing the development of a shipborne NMD system. The advantage claimed for a sea-based system is mobility-a ship can loiter off the coast of a threat nation ready to fire interceptors as soon as a launch is detected. This would theoretically catch a missile in its boost phase (which for offensive intercontinental missiles lasts between two and five minutes) while the hostile missile is traveling at a relatively slow speed, presents a high infrared profile, and is well before any deployment of its warheads and decoys. The difficulties with a sea-based system are:

1) The ship must be properly positioned so that its intercept envelope overlaps the threat missile's flight envelope. Ships positioned off North Korea's coast, for instance, would have difficulty trying to knock down an ICBM launched from that country over the North Pole.

2) To be properly positioned for intercept, ships would be confined to a relatively small "box," making the vessel easier to locate and attack.

3) The ship's crew would have to be at continuous "battle stations" to ensure that a defensive strike during boost phase could be executed at any time. The option of frequently rotating ships would require a number of additional ships-probably three for every one on station-which would rapidly add to NMD costs.

4) A defensive missile will be "chasing" the threat missile rather than intercepting it, which means the NMD booster must have greater speed. Furthermore, it must be clear quickly that the missile being tracked by the Navy is hostile and not just an unannounced test or space vehicle.

5) In terms of current technology, the Standard Missile, the "weapon" element in the Navy's evolving theater missile defense system, is not robust enough to act as an NMD-class interceptor. Conversely, the land-based interceptor being developed is too large for the vertical launch tubes on Navy cruisers and destroyers; they could only fit in Trident launch tubes on Ohio-Class ballistic missile submarines.

Lasers as NMD Boost Phase Interceptors

Although currently planned as a defense against theater missiles, a second alternative being touted for NMD boost phase intercept is the Air Force's Airborne Laser (ABL). The program has been under pressure from Congress because of technical hurdles that stymied development for some time, and the Air Force has other, higher priorities. Again, mobility is a plus, but the laser must be powerful enough and sufficiently focused to burn into the ascending rocket from afar. Considering that the new Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile is predicted to have a range of some 250 miles, the ABL must be able to knock out an ascending missile from at least this "stand-off distance" to avoid being threatened by an adversary's air defense systems, including long range fighters. In March 2000 the Air Force said it had overcome the problem of optical turbulence that had been a major technological hurdle in laser development. As with the sea-based system, however, there are questions as to how many planes will be needed to provide defensive coverage 24 hours a day in times of tension.

The Air Force had planned to demonstrate the viability of the program with a "shoot down" of a target in 2003, but this schedule could be delayed from one to three years because of financial constraints. This in turn would delay equipping the seven modified Boeing 747s the Air Force had originally planned to field starting in 2007.

Looking further into the future-out to 2020-some NMD advocates have been calling for space-based lasers (SBL) for boost phase intercepts as part of a multi-tiered missile defense shield. Theoretically, lessons from the ABL program could be incorporated into a SBL. The ABL prototype uses a laser generated from a chemical base, which may not be as feasible for the projected SBL. Until mid-July 2000, studies on system architecture and designing a vehicle for possible testing in 2012 were underway. Then, in its latest future roadmap entitled "Global Vigilance, Reach and Power," the Air Force omitted references to a deployed SBL target date of 2020.

Conclusions

The six complex NMD parts must perform perfectly as separate parts and then mesh perfectly if the system is to successfully intercept a hostile missile.

Two of three attempts to intercept a mock intercontinental range missile have failed and the third was a "qualified" success. As a result, the future test schedule is very fluid.

Technology is proving to be the brake on deployment. Discrimination-the ability to distinguish real warheads from decoys-seems to be the most complex and controversial technological hurdle.

Boost phase intercepts, while theoretically appealing as a solution to the discrimination problem, have a number of practical considerations that make this a questionable "solution."

Notes

1. The first test series of the "hit-to-kill" idea began on February 7, 1983, over a month before President Reagan's "Star Wars" speech. Of the four "Homing Overlay Experiments," only the fourth succeeded, but the General Accounting Office (GAO) later determined that the target had been heated so that the infrared sensor on the interceptor could "see" it. (See the entry for June 10, 1994 in the Chronology.) In the 1991 success of the Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Intercept System (ERIS), the target had one decoy on each side. But GAO found that discrimination was not tested because the ERIS seeker had been programmed to go after the middle of the three objects.

Sources For Further Reading...

Bethe, Jeffrey Boutwell, and Richard Garwin, "BMD Technologies and Concepts in the 1980s" in Weapons in Space, edited by Franklin Long, Donald Hafner, and Jeffrey Boutwell, The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1986.

"Strategic Defense Initiative: Some Claims Overstated for Early Flight Tests of Interceptors," United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-92-282, September 1992.

"Ballistic Missile Defense: Records Indicate Deception Program Did Not Affect 1984 Test Results," United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-94-219, July 1994. See especially Chapter 5.

"Statement of RADM Richard West, USN, Acting Director BMDO, Before the Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, June 18, 1996."

"National Missile Defense: Schedule and Technical Risks Represent Significant Development Challenges," United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-28, December 1997.

"Statement of LTG Lester Lyles, USAF, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Before the Subcommittees on Research and Development and Procurement, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, February 25, 1999."

"National Missile Defense Act of 1999" (S. 257), Congressional Record, March 17, 1999(p. S2792-2820).

Ambassador John Holum, "Talking Points," (January 20, 2000), The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

"National Missile Defense Review" (The Welch Report), November 1999.

"Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) FY99 Annual Report," February 14, 2000 (release date)

"Letter from Dr. Theodore Postol, Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Studies Program, MIT, to Mr. John Podesta, White House Chief of Staff," May 11, 2000.

"National Missile Defense Independent Review Team Executive Summary," June 13, 2000.

"Statement by LTG Ronald Kadish, USAF, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 29, 2000."

Michael Munn as quoted by William Broad, "A Missile Defense With Limits: The ABC's of the Clinton Plan," NY Times on the Web, June 30, 2000.

"Update on National Missile Defense Intercept Test," DoD News Release No. 393-00, July 8, 2000

Updates

Jan. 22, 2002: Battle emerges over sea-based missile defense — A battle is emerging over the new sea-based midcourse defense. After the cancellation of the Navy theater missile defense program, Navy Area Wide (NAW), Pentagon planners are trying to decide what kind of missile the sea-based midcourse defense system needs. The current debate is raging between the now-defunct NAW's SM-2 Blk4 missile, which used a blast-fragmentation warhead, and the Army's PAC-3, which uses a hit-to-kill warhead. A "tiger team" has been tasked to determine which system would be more effective for a sea-based missile defense. Sides are already being taken: the Missile Defense Agency supports a modified PAC-3, while the Navy wishes to continue with its SM-2 Blk4 missile. (Aerospace Daily, Jan. 22, 2002)

Jan. 25, 2002: Standard Missile-3 in Successful Intercept Test — A developmental Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) launched from the Aegis cruiser USS Lake Erie hit and destroyed a mock enemy missile in space over the Pacific Ocean on Jan. 25. The launch marked the first space intercept achieved by SM-3's new kinetic warhead. The SM-3 missile was originally developed for the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program to protect against theater ballistic missiles. Following the latest reshuffle of U.S. missile defense programs, NTW was redesignated from an independent theater missile defense system to a portion of the global ballistic missile defense system. However, last year senior Navy officials quoted in Defense Daily questioned whether the SM-3 missile would everbe able to provide true midcourse defense against long-range ballistic missiles aimed at the United States. The latest test pitted the SM-3 against an Aeries target missile, which has a shorter range and lower flight altitude than the targets used for testing the NMD system. Experts also questioned SM-3's speed and its ability to catch up with advanced long-range missiles in flight.

Jan. 25, 2002: New Alternative Booster, Decoys for NMD System — The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will use two small balloons and one large balloon to mimick decoys in the next intercept test of the proposed NMD system (now Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, GMD), Defense Daily reports. Previous tests, criticized for their simplicity, involved only one large Mylar balloon. The MDA also chose Orbital Sciences over Lockheed Martin to build an alternative booster for the NMD system. The need for an alternative booster arose after the primary model under development by Boeing encountered technical problems. All NMD tests to date have used a modified Minuteman booster provided by Lockheed Martin. The new booster will not be used for intercept testing for another several years. The Pentagon also said on Jan. 24 that it is reviewing the need to build a second kill vehicle. The MDA originally planned to commission a backup to Raytheon's system but its success in the five intercept tests to date has led the agency to re-examine the requirement, Defense News wrote on Jan. 28.

Jan. 20, 2002: Boeing To Manufacture Arrow Components for Israel — Boeing will manufacture about50 percent of components for Israel's Arrow missile under the terms of an agreement reached with Israel Aircraft Industries on Jan. 20, Defense Week reports. Israel has deployed the Arrow missile defense system, developed jointly with the United States, to counter potential missile threats, particularly from Iran and Iraq. Congress appropriated $97 million in the FY 2002 defense budget to build a manufacturing line in the United States for the Arrow missiles. Israel has sought to expand the Arrow production capacity to lower the missile's cost and to assure sufficient supply.

Jan. 14, 2002: February Missile Defense Test to Add More Complex Countermeasures — The upcoming February test of the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD, formerly NMD) system will for the first time involve several decoys, possibly more sophisticated types than used in the past, Defense Daily wrote citing Pentagon officials. Numerous experts have criticized previous tests as unrealistic because they used a very simple decoy (a Mylar balloon) and because a beacon on the warhead helped steer the interceptor to its target (see NMD Update, Dec. 3, 2001). Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, said the February test could use several decoys of the balloon type, Defense Daily wrote. He did not specify if the type of the decoy would change as well.

Jan. 11, 2002: Boeing, Lockheed Martin Tasked with Integrating Missile Defenses — Boeing Co. and Lockheed Martin Corp. will head the two industrial teams tasked with integrating the many missile defense programs under development in the United States into one system, the Wall Street Journal reported on Jan. 11. The industrial integration is a part of the sweeping overhaul, outlined in a Jan. 2 memo by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, of the way the Pentagon manages its missile defense programs (see NMD Update, Jan. 4, 2002, COSTS section). Boeing, already the lead integrator on the former NMD system, will now be in charge of integrating all U.S. missile defense programs, the Journal wrote. Lockheed Martin will be responsible for creating a single battle-management system.

Jan. 14, 2002: Ground Laser to be Tested Against UAVs — The Army plans to test the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) against unmanned aircraft, Defense Week wrote. The test could point way for a potential use of THEL against terrorist attacks by aircraft on U.S. homeland. The TRW-built THEL system was developed jointly by Israel and the United States to defend Israel against attacks by short-range Katyusha rockets from Lebanon. The Army conducted several successful tests of THEL against short-range missiles but its performance against fixed-wing aircraft is unknown. Israel decided not to deploy THEL in its current configuration and wait instead for a mobile version to be developed.

Jan. 14, 2002: MEADS Rolls On, May Add Another Missile — The company developing the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) said in January that it plans to add another missile to the system to complement the U.S.-made Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile, Defense News reports. The missile would be used against lower-level threats such as fighter aircraft, which do not warranty the use of the expensive, $2 million PAC-3 missile, Defense News wrote quoting a German defense official. Horst Binder, chairman of the Board of MEADS International, also said Jan. 9 that the program is on track to end the risk-reduction phase in 2004.

Jan. 7, 2002: Space Based Laser Program Is Dismantled — TRW and Lockheed Martin began dismantling the SBL program after Congress cut $120 million out of the Pentagon's $170 million request for the program. A SBL program official quoted in Space News said that funding cuts in the FY 2002 Defense Appropriations budget make demonstration in space impossible, but that some basic technology development will continue. The construction of the Performance Test Facility at Stennis Space Center in Mississippi is expected to stop right away, Aerospace Daily wrote. SBL, which cost about $240 million to date, was in the early stages of development.

Jan. 7, 2002: The Navy to Test SM-3, Looks for Alternatives to SM-2 Block IVA — The Navy and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA, formerly BMDO) will conduct a joint study on successors to the Navy Area Wide missile defense system, cancelled in December (see NMD Update, Dec. 15). The Navy is reportedly considering using the land-based Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) missile in a sea-based battlefield defense capacity instead of the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) Block IVA originally designed for use with Navy Area Wide, the Defense News wrote. The Navy is continuing work on the Navy Theater Wide, and plans to conduct a flight test of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) later January, Defense Daily Wrote. The SM-3 missile is designed to shoot down medium and long range ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, whereas the SM-2 was built to shoot down missiles and enemy aircraft at lower altitudes.

Jan. 3, 2002: Navy Area Wide Cancellation Reverbates Across Industry — The Dec. 14 decision to cancel the Navy Area Wide missile defense program (see NMD Update, Dec. 15) may cost the Pentagon up to $300 million in termination fees, Aerospace Daily reports. Raytheon, the Standard Missile-2 manufacturer, stands to receive about $200 million of this amount. The cancellation may not sit well with European allies, some of who planned to use the Standard Missile-2 with their Aegis ships, Defense Daily wrote, citing defense industry sources. Raytheon is continuing work on a more advanced missile, dubbed Standard Missile-3, to provide theater-wide missile defense for the Navy.

Dec. 15, 2001: Pentagon Cancels Navy Area Wide — Citing poor performance and cost overruns, the Pentagon cancelled the Navy Area Wide missile defense program on Dec. 15. Based on the Navy's Standard Missile-2 and the AEGIS radar system, the Navy Area Wide was to protect coastal cities and naval forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The program cost $2.3 billion over the past decade, according to the New York Times, but suffered from a number of technical problems and exceeded its budget by more than 50 percent. Raytheon and Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems were the prime contractors.

Dec. 13, 2001: Boeing Booster Rocket Destroyed in Test — Boeing's test of a new booster went awry after the rocket was ordered to self-destruct 30 seconds into the flight because it began to veer off course, the New York Times wrote on December 14. The new three-stage rocket is being designed to launch kill vehicles for the ground-based component of Pentagon's missile defense plans. Despite succeeding in its first test (see NMD Update, August 29, 2001), the program is now more than a year behind schedule. In August 2001, the Pentagon decided to bring a second booster into the program because of delays in building the Boeing's rocket. Orbital Sciences and Lockheed Martin have both received contracts from Boeing to research alternative booster vehicles (see NMD Update, August 9, 2001).

Dec. 9, 2001: Pentagon Restructures, Delays SBIRS-High — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld delayed the purchase of SBIRS-High satellite system by two years to allow for more research and development, Inside the Air Force reports. The delay, made at the recommendation of the Pentagon comptroller, is the second in the life of the program -- a two year delay in 1999 increased the total cost of the program by $500 million, Inside the Air Force wrote. A recent Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) report critical of SBIRS-High criticized the Air Force for its management of the program. "The continued problems... highlight the clear lack of engineering experience in the Air Force," SAC wrote in the report, as quoted by Inside the Air Force. SBIRS-High satellites are supposed to provide early warning information in the proposed national missile defense system.

Dec. 2, 2001: Air Force Building Laser Testing Facility at Edwards AFB — The U.S. Air Force is building a 60,000 square foot facility at the Edwards AFB in California to test the Airborne Laser missile defense system, the Los Angeles Daily News reports. The facility will host future ground as well as flight tests of the system, designed to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles with lasers mounted on modified Boeing 747-400 freighters. Boeing recently rolled out the first modified 747-400 and plans to integrate the aircraft with a full electronic and battle suite by 2003 (see NMD Update, Oct. 11, 2001).

Dec. 3, 2001: Successful Intercept in Latest NMD Test — A Pentagon-designed kill vehicle destroyed a mock warhead 140 miles above the Earth in the latest test of the National Missile Defense program. It was the third successful intercept in five tries. In a Dec. 3 news release, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) emphasized that the kill vehicle, after separating from the booster, used only its own sensors and data provided by a prototype X-Band radar to locate and destroy the target. Critics have dismissed past tests as unrealistic in part because the mock warhead carried a transponder which guided the kill vehicle practically all the way to its target. The transponder was used again in the Dec. 3 test but the Pentagon says that it was not used for guidance past the point of the kill vehicle's separation from the booster, over 1,400 miles from the target. In its Nov. 30 paper on NMD, the Union of Concerned Scientists, an organization critical of NMD, wrote that the transponder data alone was used to place the kill vehicle within 400 meters of the warhead in past tests of the system.

Nov. 14, 2001: SBIRS-High Over Budget, Behind Schedule — Lockheed Martin's SBIRS-High program is three years behind schedule and already twice above its originally projected price, Bloomberg.com and Aerospace Daily report citing Congressional and Air Force documents. Projected lifetime costs of the six-satellite constellation, designed to detect launches of enemy missiles, grew from $10 billion to $23 billion, according to the House Appropriations Committee documents. The system's deployment may also be delayed until 2009, three years behind the original launch time, Bloomberg.com wrote. The House Appropriations Committee report is recommending that the Air Force delay buying the system. Lockheed Martin's order is likely not in jeopardy; the company has a contract with the Air Force guaranteeing the payment of all costs plus profits, regardless of the cost growth, Bloomberg.com reports.

Nov. 7, 2001: House Appropriators to Kill SBIRS-Low — The House Appropriations Committee is considering eliminating all FY 2002 funding for the SBIRS-Low satellite constellation, the New York Times reports. The appropriators are concerned about the system's growing costs and weak performance. The funding cut would only affect next fiscal year, and the paper quoted House appropriators as saying that they want to see more development, rather than an outright cancellation of the program. The committee's report, which has yet to be approved by the full House of Representatives, recommends studying the use of ground-based radars instead of SBIRS-Low. BMDO spokesman Lt. Col. Rick Lehner dismissed ground-based radars as inadequate. "They don't have the range of space-based systems which can cover the whole planet," he told the New York Times on Nov. 7.

Oct. 29, 2001: NMD Tests Delayed for Technical Reasons, Not ABM Considerations — The Pentagon 11/16/2001 delayed next test of the NMD system for technical reasons unrelated to the ABM treaty, defense officials say. The statement contradicts Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who said on Oct. 25 that the test was delayed in order to avoid breaking the ABM treaty [see NMD Update #33, Oct. 30, 2001]. However, the spokesman for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, said on Oct. 24 that the test was postponed to allow for more ground tests for the warheads, Bloomberg.com wrote. When asked to clarify his earlier statements, Rumsfeld apologized for the misunderstanding, saying his primary concern was treaty compliance. "We do not intend to violate the ABM treaty, and we shall not," he told reporters at an Oct. 29 press conference.

Oct. 19, 2001: PAC-3 System Succeeds in Intercept Test — A Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile defense system shot down a cruise missile in the final developmental test of the system, Aerospace Daily reports. The test marks the beginning of the operation testing phase of the program, to be launched in February 2002. In the Oct. 19 test, a PAC-3 missile shot down a low-flying cruise missile while an additional PAC-2 missile intercepted a high-altitude target. PAC-3, a short range missile defense system against theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, has succeeded in nine out of 10 intercept tries, Aerospace Daily wrote.

Oct. 11, 2001: Boeing to Roll Out Modified 747 for Airborne Laser Use — The Boeing Co. plans to unveil the first modified 747-400 freigther during a Nov. 10 ceremony, the Aerospace Daily reports. The aircraft, designated YAL-1A, will feature a nose turret emitting the actual carbon dioxide laser beam as well as sensors for detecting ballistic missiles. Boeing plans to conduct flight tests early next year before installing the full battle management system, laser and optics suite in 2003, Aerospace Daily wrote. Airborne Laser, scheduled to enter production around 2005, is being designed to shoot down enemy ballistic missiles in the boost phase, shortly after take-off.

August 29, 2001: The Pentagon Launches New Countemeasures Program — The Pentagon will start developing countermeasures to allow more realistic testing of its missile defense programs, Jane's Defence Weekly reports. Previous tests of the NMD system used a single Mylar balloon decoy, raising questions about the system's performance against more sophisticated countermeasures, such as electronic jammers and chaff. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has allocated $15 million for the development of countermeasures.

August 27, 2001: Arrow-2 Test Successful — Israel has successfully shot down a mock enemy missile in the most challenging test of the Arrow-2 TMD system to date, the Jerusalem Post reports. The intercept occurred about 100 kilometers from the coastline; higher and farther than in any of the previous tests. The Arrow-2 is a joint Israeli-U.S. program, with the United States providing most of the funding ($66 million in the FY 2002 budget). Israel currently deploys one battery and another is slated for deployment soon, the Jerusalem Post reports.

August 28, 2001: Ft. Greely Construction, Lawsuit Begin — An Alaskan construction company began clearing ground for the new NMD base at Ft. Greely on Aug. 27, just as a coalition of environmental groups filed a lawsuit to slow down the Pentagon's missile defense project. Greenpeace, the National Resources Defense Council and a host of other group allege in their suit that the Pentagon failed to conduct required environmental impact studies for the proposed NMD sites. The Pentagon says that studies carried out under the Clinton administration meet the requirements of the law; the environmental groups contend that the NMD program has been altered so much that new studies are needed. If courts order that a new study be conducted, it could delay NMD deployment by months.

August 27, 2001: MEADS Program Approaches Milestone — Defense officials from Germany, Italy, and the United States will meet in September to decide on how many MEADS systems to buy and who will produce the individual components, the Defense News reports. MEADS is a medium-range ballistic missile defense system being built jointly by Lockheed Martin, Alenia (Italy) and LFK (Germany), scheduled for deployment around 2012. It uses the U.S.-manufactured PAC-3 missile, but many other components have not yet been assigned, Defense News reports.

August 29, 2001: Boeing's NMD Booster Passes First Test — The Boeing Co. conducted the first flight test of its new booster rocket intended for use with the NMD system. The three-stage rocket flew 3,000 miles from Vandenberg Air Force base in California into the Pacific Ocean. It did not carry the kill vehicle used for the actual intercept, only a payload simulating the weight of a kill vehicle. The Pentagon has been using a modified Lockheed Martin rocket in its previous tests. The Pentagon praised Boeing work in its latest assessment; a dramatic turnaround from earlier this year when the Defense Department withheld $5 million of the company's bonus for missing a test date by two months, the Defense Week reports.

August 21, 2001: Pentagon Awards Contract for Building NMD Site in Alaska — A native Alaskan company has been awarded a Pentagon contract to clear land and site preparation for the future NMD testing station Ft. Greely, Alaska, the Washington Times reported on August 21. The Ft. Greely facility is designated as a testing site but the Pentagon has also said it would form a part of the future national missile defense system. The Pentagon's legal department has judged the site legal under the ABM Treaty.

August 15, 2001: Pentagon Delays Adding Complexity to NMD Tests — The Pentagon announced on August 15 that the next NMD test, planned for October, will be an exact replay of its July test. Following the July test, in which the interceptor hit and destroyed a mock warhead, the Pentagon said it planned to use more complex and realistic scenarios in the future, including multiple decoys. However, the director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, said on August 15 that the Pentagon needs to repeat its relatively simple July test to make sure the technology works. During the last test, a computer linked to the X-band radar failed after being overwhelmed with data.

August 9, 2001: BMDO Prepares for Booster Test — The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is preparing to test a new booster for its ground-based missile defense program, the Defense Daily reports. The commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) booster developed by Boeing will fly out of Vandenberg AFB in California, and land in the Pacific Ocean. This test will not involve the interception of a target. Under its reorganized program test plans, BMDO plans to bring a second booster into the program. Orbital Sciences and Lockheed Martin have both received contracts from Boeing to research alternative booster vehicles after Boeing came under fire last year from BMDO when the booster’s development fell nearly 18 months behind schedule. Lockheed’s Payload Launch Vehicle has been used in the missile defense tests so far to carry the kill vehicle.

July 30, 2001: Role of Beacon on Warhead in Recent NMD Test Disputed — The mock warhead used in the July 14 NMD test used a broadcast beacon to help guide the interceptor to its target, Pentagon officials admitted. The interceptor destroyed its target but the use of the beacon underscores the relative simplicity of the early tests, which are not designed to simulate realistic conditions. The transponder essentially told the interceptor where in space to look for the incoming missile. "It's like a pinger saying 'Here I am'," said the former Pentagon Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation, Phil Coyle, currently a Senior Advisor at CDI. The Department of Defense argues that the beacon had to be used to compensate for the absence of guidance radars, which are yet to be built and deployed. "There is absolutely nothing wrong with [using the beacon] this early in the program," Coyle told the Defense News. "It's just one of many things that have to be changed so that the flights can be more realistic in the future."

July 17, 2001: Pentagon Officials Unveil Sweeping Missile Defense Strategy — Elements of the Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative reappeared in the Pentagon's new ambitious missile defense plan unveiled at a recent conference in Huntsville, Alabama. The executive director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), Robert Snyder, announced that the Pentagon plans to test a space-based hit-to-kill system reminiscent of the Brilliant Pebbles program cancelled in the early 1990s. The hit-to-kill proposal is a new element, different from the space-based laser mentioned in earlier proposals. The BMDO also plans to pursue a sea-based X-band radar, which may obviate the need for radar bases on European territory. The majority of the missile defense systems mentioned in BMDO's plans are either at very early stage of development or exist only as paper concepts. The U.S. military currently has about 20 missile defense programs under development, the Defense Week reported.

July 14, 2001: Successful Hit, Radar Failure in Saturday's Test — The Pentagon has succeeded for the second time in four tries in shooting down an intercontinental ballistic missile target when its kill vehicle hit and destroyed a mock warhead launched by a Minuteman missile over the Pacific on Saturday. Defense officials disclosed on Tuesday that a software glitch caused a crucial X-band radar to falsely report a miss. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, commenting on the test, said that "ballistic missile defense is no longer a problem of invention, but rather a challenge of engineering." Future tests will require the mock warhead to be surrounded by multiple decoys to draw the interceptor away from the target as opposed to the single one used in Saturday’s test. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) plans at least 20 intercept tests over the next five years.

July 9, 2001: Patriot Test Fails — The latest version of the Patriot missile, PAC-3, missed a missile target in a July 9 test due to a communication breakdown between subsystems, the Defense Week wrote. The test scenario called for a nearly simultaneous destruction of an aircraft and a missile target, but only the aircraft was hit. The PAC-3 version has an otherwise solid test record with seven hits in eight tries which, however, presented easier scenarios than the July 9 test. The Pentagon wants to buy 72 of the PAC-3 missiles in 2002 and 1,130 during the life of the program, the Defense Week wrote.

July 16, 2001: Navy Missile Defense Program Delayed by Nearly Two Years — The Navy’s short-range missile defense program has been delayed 20 months by technical challenges, the Defense Week wrote, referring to internal Pentagon documents. The system, considered among the most advanced of the Pentagon's missile defense programs, suffers from guidance and software glitches. In other news, the Navy is also exploring new radars for NMD, including a new type of long-range, all-weather S-band radar, the Defense News reports.

July 9, 2001: Pentagon Plans to Test Missile Defense System on July 14 — The Pentagon is planning a fourth test of its ground-based missile defense system on July 14. The test will be the first since last July's failed attempt to shoot down a long-range missile with a Raytheon hit-to-kill warhead. The July 14 test will virtually mirror last July's test, although this time the Pentagon is downplaying the importance of the test, saying it will move forward with missile defense plans regardless of the outcome. Only one of the previous three tests has been successful, but missile critics argued that the successful test was flawed.

July 2, 2001: Senator Makes Push to Place Missile Interceptors in Alaska — Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) is trying to add language to the 2001 supplemental appropriations bill that would allow the Bush Administration to operate a missile defense system at Fort Greeley, Alaska. BMDO Director Lt. General Ronald Kadish told the committee earlier in June that BMDO has come up with an "option" to put an initial batch of 10 "test" interceptors in Alaska using radar on Shemya Island. Placing interceptors on the island would directly violate the ABM Treaty. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld confirmed that the option does exist, but that DoD lawyers are divided over whether placing the interceptors in Alaska would actually violate the Treaty.

June 27, 2001: Pentagon To Shuffle Missile Defense Programs — The Pentagon will restructure its missile defense programs into three parts: boost, midcourse, and terminal defense, according to the draft FY'02 defense budget obtained by CDI. It also plans to transfer the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3), the Medium Extended Air Defense (MEADS) and the Navy Area missile defense program from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to the Army and the Navy, respectively. Responsibility for two other programs — the Airborne Laser and the Space Based Laser — is being moved from the Air Force to the BMDO. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is also being awarded $277 million for the research of a yet unspecified boost-phase defense system.

June 27, 2001: NMD Testing, Capability Criticized — None of the NMD systems are mature enough to allow adequate performance evaluation, concluded an internal Pentagon report prepared last August, Defense Week writes. The Department of Defense recently released the report to members of Congress (see NMD Update, June 12, 2001). Former Pentagon chief of testing and evaluation, Philip E. Coyle (currently a senior advisor to CDI) authored the study, which also criticized NMD testing as too 'rehearsed' and unrealistic. As an example, it cites the only successful NMD test to date, in which a Global Positioning System inside the mock warhead helped guide the interceptor missile to its target.

June 27, 2001: Airborne Laser Three Years Behind Schedule — The Air Force says that the Airborne Laser (ABL) program will not be ready until 2010, three years behind schedule, Defense Week reports. The Air Force program officer for ABL, cited in the article, blamed the delay on funding shortfalls: $960 million was cut from ABL funding, said Col. Ellen Palikowski, according to Defense Week. Partly in response to the program's funding and technical woes, the Pentagon has decided to move ABL out of Air Force's purvey and making it the responsibility of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (see NMD Update #22, "Pentagon to Shuffle Missile Defense Programs").

June 14, 2001: Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, head of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) said on June 14 that he would like to more than double the number and increase the complexity of the tests of the national missile defense system. The BMDO chief said he would like to hold eight tests a year, instead of the planned three. "If we want to make that more robust and more realistic, then I would add more tests per unit time, and I would also add more complexity sooner to the mix," he said. Lt. Gen. Kadish made the remarks during his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. He also appealed to the panel for more funding — the relatively simple NMD tests conducted to date cost a $100 million each.

June 13, 2001: Pentagon officials are exploring the possibility of boosting funding for the Army's Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system in order to field it a year or two earlier than 2007, said Sen. Thad Cochran (R-MS) on June 13, as quoted in Aerospace Daily. THAAD is an upper-tier theater missile defense system designed to protect U.S. forces from missile and aircraft attacks. The Navy also made a renewed push for a speedy deployment of a rudimentary NMD capability. Rear Admiral Rodney Rempt, the assistant chief for naval operations, said on June 14 that the Navy is ready to deploy an "emergency" global missile defense system within 12 to 18 months, at a cost of $150 million to $200 million, the Aerospace Daily wrote.

June 12, 2001: Rep. John Tierny (D-MA) wrote in a June 12 letter to top congressional leaders that the Pentagon has supressed an internal report that "highlights severe deficiencies" in the NMD program, the Defense News wrote. The report, authored by the former Pentagon chief tester, Philip Coyle (currently a Senior Advisor to CDI), disclosed malfunctions in NMD's command and control system and other subsystems. The Pentagon has not approved a release of the report, which was apparently never classified, and only distributed it to those who "have an official need to see it," the Defense News wrote.

June 8, 2001: The Bush administration has made development of the Airborne Laser system a priority and plans substantial increases in the program's funding, the Wichita Eagle reports. The 2001 supplemental budget request by the Department of Defense hiked Airborne Laser funding by 65 percent, adding $153 million to previous year's $234 million allocation. "Clearly the Airborne Laser has been identified as one of the most promising technologies that we are going to pursue," said an unnamed administration official quoted in the paper.

May 25, 2001: Three PAC-2 missiles fired from Eglin AFB in Florida successfully hit three separate targets in a May 21 test. The purpose of the tests was to collect data in a low altitude "sea clutter" setting. Raytheon, which built the PAC-2 system, is attempting to sell the PAC-2 system to Egypt, South Korea, and Taiwan. PAC-2 is a theater missile defense program designed to protect troops in and near areas of conflict from enemy missile attacks.

May 25, 2001: The Boeing Co. has proposed building an X-band radar in continental United States and shipping it to Alaska, its intended site under the current NMD plans, by boat, Aerospace Daily reports quoting congressional sources. Alaska's climate severely limits the time when construction is possible on Shemya Island, which is slated to house the radar. Construction of the radar could take much shorter if most of it could be built outside Alaska and shipped to a prepared destination.

May 14, 2001: The Pentagon plans to restructure the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to reflect changes in NMD architecture, Defense News reports. Under the plan, BMDO will be organized into three parts focusing on the three stages of ballistic missile flight: boost phase, midcourse, and terminal, said the report based on Pentagon and congressional sources. The original NMD plan proposed under President Clinton focused on intercepting missiles in the terminal phase but President Bush called for a more ambitious system aimed at the boost phase and midcourse phases as well.

May 14, 2001: The report by MIT scientist and a leading critic of NMD Theodore Postol contained classified information, FBI concluded. In May 2000, Dr. Postol send a report to the White House in which he accused NMD contractors of falsifying test data (see related NMD Update, May 8, 2001). Dr. Postol also charged that the Pentagon tried to silence him by threatening action over allegedly disclosing classified data. The FBI report confirms that the Postol report did contain secret information but only because the Pentagon failed to remove the data from an unclassified paper which served as Dr. Postol's source.

May 14, 2001: Five former top-level Department of Defense and NASA scientists said that missile defense technology is proven and will work, Aerospace Daily reports. "There are no technological show-stoppers," said Raymond Askew, formerly NASA's space station chief scientist. The panel, assembled by key NMD proponent, Rep. Curt Weldon, attributed NMD test failures to quality control issues which do not "bear on the basic feasibility of the hit-to-kill technology," said the panel on May 9.

May 8, 2001: The FBI cleared TRW Inc. of charges of fraud and cover-up stemming from the 1997 flight test of the national missile defense system. FBI launched the investigation at the urging of 53 members of Congress after MIT scientist Theodore Postol and former TRW expert Dr. Nina Schwartz alleged that TRW manipulated data to produce a successful test result. The FBI dismissed the lawsuit saying that it is a scientific dispute with no criminal basis.

May 1, 2001: Lockheed Martin will expand its role in NMD to include additional booster work, a portion of the system previously reserved to Boeing, Defense Daily reported. Boeing has come under fire for falling behind schedule in developing new booster rockets. Previous NMD tests have used an older Lockheed Martin rocket, and the company indicated to the Pentagon that it would like to build the new booster as well.

May 1, 2001: An advisory panel reviewing U.S. defense policies has recommended that the United States build an ambitious, multi-layered missile defense system with ground, sea, air, and space components. The so-called 'transformation task force' committee is one of nearly 20 panels created by President George W. Bush to review a range of the Pentagon's policies. Its findings are not binding, but both Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld are known to favor an early deployment of a missile defense system far more powerful and complex than the limited ground system advocated by President Bill Clinton.

May 1, 2001: The Navy will conduct a sweeping review of how it performs its missile defense roles, Inside Missile Defense reports. The performance assessment is meant to provide guidance for future budgeting needs. The review, however, may have implications for U.S. plans to deploy a national missile defense system. The Navy has proposed to the Pentagon a plan to use its Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyers to shoot down enemy missiles during the ascent stage of flight. The Navy's Theater Wide System, currently under development, is also being considered for an NMD role.

April 13, 2001: Raytheon has thrown its weight behind the Navy's calls for a larger role in the NMD architecture by announcing that, with sufficient funds, the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system could be fielded as early as 2004, the Defense Daily reported. A Raytheon representative quoted in the article said that the NTW program is merely "funding constrained," and could easily be accelerated. A recent report by the Pentagon's Office of Operational Test and Evaluation concluded that NTW, an upper-tier system designed to defeat medium and long range missiles, suffers from several shortcomings, including insufficiently accurate radar and a propulsion system that does not generate enough speed to intercept missiles during the 'boost," or ascent, phase of flight. The Navy is proposing to deploy NTW jointly with the more limited Navy Area Defense system (see NMD Update, April 5, 2001).

April 13, 2001: The Air Force has approved a SBIRS-Low design proposed by a Raytheon-TRW industry team, clearing the way for the program to enter the engineering and manufacturing development stage, InsideDefense.com reports. SBIRS-Low, a network of low-earth orbit satellites and a part of the NMD architecture, is being designed to track enemy missiles and differentiate between warheads and decoys. The Air Force will review another proposal by a competing industry group, led by Spectrum Astro and Northrop Grumman, on April 23, InsideDefence.com reports.

April 5, 2001: The U.S. Navy has proposed to the White House to deploy a near-term boost-phase missile defense system in Asia based on Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyers, the Jane's Defence Weekly reports. The Navy proposes upgrades to the hardware and software of the destroyers' prototype missile defense system, which, the Navy believes, would render them capable in 18 months of shooting down North Korea's Taepo Dong missiles during the initial (boost) phase of flight. Besides a number of unresolved technical problems, a boost-phase system also raises command issues — the commander in the field would have to be authorized in advance to fire since a boost-phase intercept requires a response within seconds of launch detection.

April 5, 2001: The new Boeing rocket slated to carry NMD interceptors will not be tested until August at the earliest, four months behind schedule, Defense Week reported. Boeing is experiencing technical difficulties with a number of the missile's systems. Previous NMD tests have used an older Lockheed Martin missile; the Pentagon will not be able to use the new Boeing missile for NMD tests until June 2002, according to the Defense Week.

April 5, 2001: The Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) missile has successfully engaged and destroyed two simultaneously launched targets during a March 31 test. PAC-3 is a lower-tier theater missile defense system designed to protect troops against attacks from cruise and ballistic missiles as well as enemy aircraft. This was the eighth successful test of the system, which is scheduled to enter full production in 2002. The PAC-3 system is a modernized version of the Patriot made famous during the Persian Gulf War. A recent report by the Pentagon's Office of Operational Test and Evaluation praised PAC-3 for its successful testing record, but noted that the ground component suffers from serious reliability problems.

March 9, 2001: The Space News reports that the Pentagon will stretch out the SBIRS Low satellites launch schedule to allow for more in-orbit testing. The 24 (projected) SBIRS Low satellites are designed to improve launch detection and warhead-decoy discrimination in the proposed NMD architecture. The program has run into technical difficulties and fallen behind schedule in recent years. The Pentagon now says it may not have the system ready by 2010, as originally planned.

March 9, 2001: Sea-based NMD will not be ready until 2006 at the earliest, says a new Pentagon report. The findings put in doubt efforts by the Bush Administration to expand NMD architecture from land to sea platforms. The Defense Week quoted the former Pentagon test chief, Phil Coyle, as saying that he "does not consider ... a near term - within five years- upgrade of NTW [Navy Theatre Wide] to be a viable national missile defense option." Coyle signed the report before resigning from the Pentagon in January.

February 27, 2001: The Air Force's Airborne Laser (ABL) program took a step forward in late February with the opening of the "Beam Control/Fire Control System" test facility run by Lockheed Martin. The development contract for the ABL, worth $1.6 billion, calls for a live fire test in 2003. In its final configuration, the beam control system will be placed in the nose of the seven Boeing 747s that are to be modified to carry the ABL. The ABL is being developed to attack theater ballistic missiles in their boost phase.

February 23, 2001: The foreign affairs spokesperson for Australia’s opposition Labor Party warned that “NMD has the potential to trigger a new nuclear arms race in the Asia-Pacific region and seriously undermine global disarmament and nonproliferation agreements.” Australia hosts the Pine Gap Joint Defense Space Research Facility, which is to serve as crucial part of the NMD architecture, downloading and processing early warning data gathered by U.S. infrared sensor-equipped satellites. The Labor Party is widely expected to win the next general elections due to be held by November. Its statement of opposition to NMD follows remarks late last year by the former Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, who warned that Australian participation in NMD would make the country “hostage to US actions” and “a first-rate target in the event of hostilities between America and another country.”

January 23, 2001: The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization chose the John Stennis Space Facility in Mississippi for testing its Space Based Laser (SBL) anti-missile system. The testing facilities will be built between 2002 and 2006, the Defense Week reported. President George W. Bush said he is open to expanding the planned NMD architecture from land to sea, air, and space based defenses. The SBL program aims at building as many as 40 satellites capable of shooting down incoming missiles, with a functioning demonstrator in space by 2013.

January 8, 2001: The Air Force's Airborne Laser (ABL) program needs $98 million more this year than the $234 million appropriated by Congress. Of the additional funding, $64 million is for activities originally scheduled for later in the program, including efforts to reduce the weight of certain materials, while $34 million is needed to cover cost growth in the program. While technically a theater missile defense system and not part of the current NMD architecture, the ABL could conceivably be used as a boost-phase interceptor as part of an integrated NMD network. Current cost of the ABL program is $11.3 billion to equip seven Boeing 747s with on board lasers.

December 12, 2000: The Pentagon proposes to stagger launches of Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High satellites, Space News reported. Launches of the second through fourth satellites could be delayed by a year, allowing the Pentagon to shift SBIRS-High funds to other programs. The cost of the SBIRS-High program has already nearly doubled, from $1.8 billion to $3 billion, thanks to delays in the development stage. The proposed staggering would raise the overall cost of the program further. Under the current NMD plans, SBIRS-High satellites are to detect enemy missile launches and track those missiles. The proposal to stagger their launches came from the Pentagon's Comptroller office and may yet be appealed by the services.

December 12, 2000: The Navy will need additional ships if the United States decides to pursue a sea-based component of the NMD system, said Rear Adm. Joseph A. Sestak, Jr., director of the Navy's Quadrennial Defense Review. According to Adm. Sestak, 30% of Navy's vessels are currently forward deployed, compared to 20% in the early 1990's, and there are no plans to reduce the Navy's forward presence. Therefore, any decision to expand the Navy's core missions, including involvement in an NMD system, "must come with additional resources to conduct that mission in the form of additional force structure."

November 13, 2000: The Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) has asked Boeing to study the possibility of building new radars instead of upgrading the existing early-warning radars earmarked for NMD use. Current NMD plans call for the early-warning radars to detect enemy missile launches and to hand off the information to X-band radars, which would identify and track the missiles. BMDO stressed that the request is "for information only" and does not represent a change in the planned architecture (Defense News).

October 24, 2000: On October 24, 2000, Representative David Vitter (R-LA) introduced H.R. 5536, titled "To declare the policy of the United States with respect to deployment of a National Missile Defense System." The bill consists of one 45-word sentence: "The Secretary of Defense shall direct the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to design and deploy a land-based and sea-based National Missile Defense system capable of defending the national territory of the United States against ballistic missile attack as soon as technological possible." Rep. Vitter said that his measure includes a sea-based component because "a dual system offers a level of redundancy that will enhance the safety...of the American people." —>

More Information

For more information please e-mail Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), at dsmith@cdi.org .