Colombia (Human Rights Watch Report, 12 April 2002)
Negotiations between
the government and leftist guerrillas reached an impasse in 2001 as both sides
traded accusations of bad faith and broken promises. Political violence
increased for the second consecutive year and became increasingly urban, with
clashes and selective killings occurring in cities. Colombians continued to
flee their homes and even their country in record numbers, facing hunger, the
elements, and disease in desperate efforts to save themselves and their
families.
In the first ten months of the year, the office of the Public Advocate
(Defensoría del Pueblo) recorded ninety-two
massacres, which they defined as the killing of three or more people at the
same place and at the same time. Most were linked to paramilitary groups,
followed by guerrillas. Both paramilitaries and guerrillas reportedly moved
with ease throughout the country, including via helicopter.
One of the year's worst massacres occurred on January 17, in Chengue, Sucre.
Witnesses told government investigators that several Colombian navy units
looked the other way as heavily armed paramilitaries traveled past them to the
village. Paramilitaries assembled villagers in two groups, the Washington Post later reported.
"Then, one by one, they killed the men by crushing their heads with heavy
stones and a sledgehammer. When it was over, twenty-four men lay dead in pools
of blood. Two more were found later in shallow graves. As the troops left, they
set fire to the village."
The authorities subsequently arrested Navy Sergeant Rubén Darío Rojas and charged him with supplying
weapons to paramilitaries and helping coordinate the attack. Colombia's
Internal Affairs agency (Procuraduría) filed
disciplinary charges against Navy Brig. Gen. Rodrigo Quiñones and five other security force officers for allegedly ignoring
detailed information received in advance about paramilitary movements near
Chengue. At the time, Quiñones was the commander of the first
Naval Brigade. Despite the charges, he was later promoted to the post of navy
chief of staff.
As the Chengue case showed, certain military units and police detachments
continued to promote, work with, support, profit from, and tolerate
paramilitary groups, treating them as a force allied to and compatible with
their own. At their most brazen, these relationships involved active
coordination during military operations between government and paramilitary
units; communication via radios, cellular telephones, and beepers; the sharing
of intelligence, including the names of suspected guerrilla collaborators; the
sharing of fighters, including active-duty soldiers serving in paramilitary
units and paramilitary commanders lodging on military bases; the sharing of
vehicles, including army trucks used to transport paramilitary fighters;
coordination of army roadblocks, which routinely let heavily-armed paramilitary
fighters pass; and payments made from paramilitaries to military officers for
their support.
Overall, President Andrés Pastrana and his defense ministers
failed to take effective action to establish control over the security forces
and break their persistent ties to paramilitary groups. Even as President
Pastrana publicly deplored atrocities, the high-ranking officers he commanded
failed to take steps necessary to prevent killings by suspending security force
members suspected of abuses, ensuring that their cases were handed over to
civilian judicial authorities for investigation and prosecution, and pursuing
and arresting paramilitary leaders.
Paramilitaries allied under the umbrella United Self Defense Group of Colombia
(Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) expanded their radius of action and
troop strength in 2001. In June, AUC commander Carlos Castaño announced that he had relinquished military leadership and
dedicated himself to organizing its political wing. Since 1996, the group had
grown by over 560 percent, according to Castaño,
who claimed a force of over 11,000 fighters. In some situations, as with the
temporary seizure of a community of displaced people in Esperanza en Dios and
Nueva Vida, Chocó, paramilitaries reportedly operated
with as many as eight hundred troops at a time. Large concentrations of
paramilitaries were rarely challenged by the Colombian security forces.
Over a period of a week in early July, in the town of Peque, Antioquia, over
five hundred armed and uniformed paramilitaries blockaded roads, occupied
municipal buildings, looted, cut all outside communication, and prevented food
and medicines from being shipped in, according to the Public Advocate's office.
Over 5,000 Colombians were forced to flee. When the paramilitaries left, church
workers counted at least nine dead and another ten people
"disappeared," several of them children. As a local official said:
"The state abandoned us. This was a massacre foretold. We alerted the
regional government the paramilitaries were coming and they didn't send
help."
During much of 2000, the AUC paid monthly salaries to local army and police
officials based on rank in the department of Putumayo, where U.S.-funded and
trained counternarcotics battalions were deployed. In the state of Cauca,
soldiers moonlighting as paramilitaries earned up to $500 per month. These
salaries far exceeded the average Colombian's monthly income.
Mayors, municipal officials, governors, human rights groups, the Public
Advocate's office and even some police detachments regularly informed the
appropriate authorities about credible threats by paramilitaries or even
massacres that were taking place. An early warning system paid for by the
United States and administered by the office of the Public Advocate registered
twenty separate warnings nationwide between June, when the system began to
function, and September. But rarely did the government take effective action to
prevent atrocities. Of the warnings that were received, eleven incidents
resulted either in killings being committed or the continued, pronounced
presence of armed groups that threatened civilians.
Paramilitaries were linked to the murders of Colombians working to foster
peace, among them three congressmen. On June 2, armed men believed to be
paramilitaries seized Kimy Pernia Domicó, a leader
of the Emberá-Katío
community in the department of Córdoba, who
remained "disappeared" at this writing. Three weeks after he was
abducted, another Emberá-Katío
leader who had been active in calls for Domicó's
release was abducted by presumed paramilitaries and later killed. As these killings
showed, certain groups faced special risks, among them indigenous groups, trade
unionists, journalists, human rights defenders, and peace advocates.
The security forces were also directly implicated in abuses. In May, it was
revealed that a combined police-army unit had illegally tapped over 2,000
telephone lines in the city of Medellín, many
belonging to nongovernmental and human rights groups. The police officer who
apparently helped place the taps was killed in April in circumstances that
remained unclear.
Prosecutors implicated a former Colombian army major and an active duty police
captain along with Carlos Castaño in the
December 21, 2000, attack on trade union leader Wilson Borja, who was seriously
wounded. In the first ten months of 2001, 125 trade unionists were murdered
according to the Central Workers Union (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores, CUT),
which represents most Colombian unions.
With the stated goal of furthering peace talks, the government continued to
allow the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP) to maintain
control over a Switzerland-sized area in southern Colombia. During the year,
the two sides agreed on a prisoner exchange that led to the release of 364
captured members of the police and military forces, and fourteen imprisoned
FARC-EP members. Several freed officers reported that FARC-EP guerrillas abused
them during captivity. Colombian National Police (CNP) Col. Álvaro León Acosta, captured on April 5, 2000,
suffered from serious ailments and excruciating pain stemming from an untreated
back injury. Other captives reported jungle diseases, including malaria, fungi,
constant diarrhea because of contaminated water, and leishmaniasis, which can
be fatal if untreated. Guerrillas never allowed the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) or other independent groups to visit captured combatants,
dozens of whom remained in the group's custody.
Criticism of the FARC-EP intensified as evidence mounted that the group used
its area of control not only to warehouse prisoners and kidnaped civilians, but
also to plan and mount attacks, including assaults that caused civilian
casualties. The FARC-EP frequently used indiscriminate weapons, specifically
gas cylinder bombs.
The FARC-EP continued to kill civilians throughout Colombia, with human rights
groups reporting 197 such killings in the first ten months of the year. Among
the victims was former culture minister Consuelo Araújo Noguera, abducted by the FARC-EP on September 24. The wife of
Colombia's Internal Affairs director, Araújo Noguera
was apparently executed by guerrillas during a Colombian army rescue attempt.
Other victims included Paez leader Cristóbal Secué Escué, a former president of the Cauca
Indigenous Regional Council (Consejo Regional Indígena
del Cauca, CRIC), who was shot on June 25 near his home in Corinto, Cauca. The
FARC-EP accused Paez communities of forming "civic guards" that were
like paramilitary groups, a charge indigenous leaders denied. Secué was, at the time of the killing, serving as a judge investigating
several alleged murders by FARC-EP guerrillas.
Kidnaping remained a source of income and political pressure for the FARC-EP.
In July, the group carried out its first mass kidnaping from an apartment
building, seizing sixteen people after blowing the doors off a residence in
Neiva, Huila. Among those kidnaped were children as young as five years old.
Six people were later released.
After Human Rights Watch wrote to FARC-EP leader Manuel Marulanda to protest
these violations, he dismissed the letter as "Yankee interventionism,
disguised as a humanitarian action."
For its part, the Camilist Union-National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, UC-ELN) violated international humanitarian law by
launching indiscriminate attacks and committing kidnapings. After the
government suspended talks with the group on August 7, the UC-ELN set off a
series of car and package bombs in the department of Antioquia, including the
city of Medellín, killing passers-by and destroying
electrical towers and public buses. Two weeks earlier, over fifteen UC-ELN
guerrillas died when bombs they were placing along a road exploded in the truck
carrying them.
There were some advances on accountability, principally by the office of the
attorney general under the direction of Alfonso Gómez Méndez, who completed his four-year term in July. On May 25,
prosecutors seized valuable information related to paramilitary financing
networks and communications in the city of Montería, Córdoba, long considered an AUC stronghold. During the raid,
prosecutors searched the home of Salvatore Mancuso, a Montería native who was said to be the AUC's military commander. In part,
the investigation focused on how landowners and business people in the region
donated heavily to the AUC.
The attorney general's office also pursued important cases involving laws of
war violations, among them the murder in December 29, 2000, of Congressman
Diego Turbay and six others outside Florencia, Caquetá. The massacre took place as Turbay, chair of the Peace Commission
in Colombia's House of Representatives, and his companions were headed toward a
meeting with guerrilla leaders in Los Pozos. The FARC-EP denied committing this
massacre, but the attorney general opened a formal investigation of alleged
guerrillas based on testimonies of captured gunmen and other evidence.
New Attorney General Luis Osorio set a disturbing precedent when he forced the
resignation of the director of the Human Rights Unit, the former director of
the Human Rights Unit, and the former head of the Technical Investigations Unit
(Cuerpo Técnico de Investigaciones, CTI) during
his first hours in office. This change in leadership and the message it sent
threatened to reverse or hamper important investigations and led to a slowdown
or suspension of important cases, including the Chengue massacre.
Osorio objected to the unit's decision to order the July 23 arrest of Gen.
(ret.) Rito Alejo del Río for his alleged support of
paramilitary groups while in command of the army's Seventeenth Brigade in
Carepa, Antioquia, between 1995 and 1997. Del Río was
among the officers dismissed from the army by President Pastrana because of his
poor human rights record. Also, the United States canceled his visa to the
United States because of his alleged involvement in acts of terrorism and drug
trafficking.
The Security and National Defense Law that President Pastrana signed on August
13 threatened to reinforce impunity for human rights abuses. The law gave the
security forces judicial police powers under certain circumstances and severely
restricted the ability of civilian investigators to initiate disciplinary
investigations against security force personnel for human rights violations
committed during operations. Also, the law limited the obligation of the armed
forces to inform judicial authorities about the detention of suspects,
increasing the risk of torture.
Since the president signed a new military penal code in 2000 that allowed
military commanders to dismiss subordinates implicated in a wide range of
crime, the Defense Ministry claimed that over five hundred people had been
removed from the service. However, the government provided no information indicating
the reason for the dismissals, which could range from incompetence to
involvement in human rights crimes. In addition, there was no evidence that any
of these individuals subsequently faced criminal investigations for human
rights violations. Meanwhile, officers charged with abuses remained on active
duty and in charge of groups in the field.
The Colombian government also argued that it arrested hundreds of
paramilitaries and dismissed their military supporters. However, arrests were
mainly of low-ranking individuals, some of whom were speedily released.
Landmines were a threat to civilians throughout Colombia. According to the
Colombian army and independent landmine monitors, the total number of landmines
in Colombia was estimated at 130,000. Deaths and injuries resulting from their
use were up sharply. Through mid-July 2001, the Colombian Campaign Against Land
Mines recorded eighty-eight people killed or maimed by landmines, mostly
farmers and their children. Colombia has signed but not yet ratified the 1999
Ottawa Convention banning the use, stockpiling, and export of landmines.
Forced displacement continued to increase, with at least 300,000 Colombians
reported displaced in 2001, the highest number ever in a single year.
Increasingly, Colombians applied for exit visas to travel abroad and applied
for political asylum in other countries.
Kofi Asomani, the United Nations special coordinator on internal displacement
of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, visited Colombia in
August and concluded that the conflict had "catastrophic
consequences" for the civilian population. Despite government programs
meant to assist the displaced, Asomani found that they continued to suffer
extreme hardship, living in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions with limited
access to basic services.
DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS
Colombia continued to
be an extremely dangerous place for human rights defenders as well as for
government investigators handling human rights and international humanitarian
law investigations. In the first ten months of 2001, eleven defenders were
killed according to the CCJ.
Among the victims was lawyer Alma Rosa Jaramillo Lafourie, who worked with the
Middle Magdalena Development and Peace Program (Programa de Desarrollo y Paz del
Magdalena Medio, PDPMM). Seized by presumed paramilitaries in Morales, in the
department of Bolívar, on June 29, locals found her body
two days later dumped in a rural area. According to associates, Jaramillo was
tortured before being executed. Another PDPMM colleague, Eduardo Estrada, was
murdered in similar circumstances on July 18 in the town of San Pablo, Bolívar. Colombia's Pacific coast was also dangerous. On September 19,
armed men shot and killed Roman Catholic nun and human rights defender Yolanda
Cerón Delgado in front of a church in
Tumaco, Nariño.
Paramilitaries intensified an announced campaign to murder prosecutors and
investigators of cases that implicated paramilitary leaders. During 2001, seven
government investigators were murdered by alleged paramilitary gunmen. Among
them were the three investigators who worked most closely on the investigation
of the Chengue massacre. Several key witnesses to important cases were also
killed while in government custody or while in the process of supplying
information to prosecutors. The office in Colombia of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) called these killings "a systematic
campaign of retaliation and intimidation" by those seeking "total
impunity for the most serious crimes committed in the country."
Human rights defenders were among the main targets of the paramilitary advance
in Barrancabermeja that began in December 2000. Members of the Regional
Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and the Popular Women's Organization
(Organización Femenina Popular, OFP) received
multiple death threats by telephone and in person, and paramilitaries destroyed
a house they used to hold events. "The paramilitaries are not just killing
us physically, they are also killing our ability to organize, to be community
leaders," said Yolanda Becerra, OFP president. "We have been forced
to shut down projects outside the city, because the paramilitaries have banned
us from traveling by river."
Some government offices attempted to protect threatened defenders, supplying
bodyguards, bulletproof reinforcement for offices, and an emergency response
network operated by handheld radios. The CNP Human Rights office and the
Interior Ministry, in particular, took steps to protect defenders and to
investigate specific allegations of police collaboration with paramilitary
groups. The Interior Ministry provided protection or relocation assistance to
747 people between May and mid-September of 2001.
In many instances, however, government response was slow, nonexistent, or
abusive. For example, the commander of the Barrancabermeja-based CNP, Col. José Miguel Villar Jiménez,
attacked human rights groups by claiming that they had their "origin in
[guerrillas], which attempt to throw mud on the good work that is done constantly
with reports and information that also has an echo in the different
international Non-Governmental Organizations."
THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The international
community played a prominent role in efforts to resolve Colombia's conflict.
France, Switzerland, Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, Norway, Spain, Italy, Canada, and
Sweden agreed to meet every two weeks with the FARC-EP and act as
"facilitator countries" for the peace process.
United Nations
The office of the
UNHCHR continued to operate in Colombia, despite poor cooperation from
Colombian government officials. As High Commissioner Mary Robinson noted in the
office's annual report, "the overwhelming majority of Governmental
responses to Office communications about specific cases and situations (such as
early warnings) have been unsatisfactory, inoperative and purely
bureaucratic." The end result, she emphasized, was that "the
potential of the Office has been greatly underutilized by the Government."
Before announcing his departure at year's end, Jan Egeland, the special adviser
on Colombia to the United Nations Secretary-General, frequently visited
Colombia to assist in peace talks, but was prevented by the government from
remaining in the country for more than eight days at a time.
Special representative of the secretary-general on human rights defenders, Hina
Jilani, undertook a fact-finding mission to Colombia in October at the
invitation of the Colombian government. It ended bitterly, after Jilani raised
questions about the new Attorney General and his commitment to prosecuting
cases involving high-ranking military officers.
European Union
Political relations
with the European Union were strengthened in 2001. In March, E.U. Foreign
Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten met with President Pastrana in Colombia.
Shortly after, Patten announced a 3 million euro aid package in support of the
displaced population and the launching of an Andean regional human rights
program.
In July, the European Union expressed deep concern at mounting violence, in
particular the holding up of a U.N. vehicle and the abduction of one it its
Colombian occupants, former Meta department governor Alan Jara, as well as
three German aid workers. The FARC-EP acknowledged abducting the workers in a
communiqué. The incidents, the E.U. stated,
"seriously jeopardize the peace process and openly flout elementary
principles of international law." In October, one of the German hostages
escaped and the remaining two were later released. Jara remained in FARC-EP custody
as of this writing.
Spanish authorities detained Carlos Arturo Marulanda, the former Colombian
ambassador to the European Union, on charges that he supported paramilitary
groups that killed and threatened farmers in the department of Cesar. A
Colombian judge ordered the arrest after receiving information that allegedly
linked the diplomat directly to paramilitary support. Marulanda remained in
Spain at this writing awaiting the outcome of extradition hearings.
United States
The United States
continued to focus on the aerial eradication of drug-producing crops and was
increasingly and publicly skeptical of the peace process. U.S. State Department
spokesman Philip Reeker charged in August that the FARC-EP was "misusing
the demilitarized zone to abuse prisoners, engage in narcotics trafficking and,
for example, reportedly receive training from the Irish Republican Army,"
referring to three Irish nationals charged in Colombia in August with helping
train guerrillas. At the same time, U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson made several
important public statements in support of human rights.
Despite such concerns, the United States remained Colombia's largest foreign
donor. It also increased military aid to Colombia's neighbors, in an effort to
strengthen border controls against both armed groups and trafficking.
In March, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced to the U.S. Congress that
he would seek another $400 million for Colombia for fiscal year (FY) 2002,
roughly equivalent to the amount Colombia received in 2000 and in 2001. At this
writing, the legislation contained human rights conditions and no waiver
authority, meaning that Colombia would have to show concrete progress in
breaking ties between the security forces and paramilitaries in order to
receive aid. A day before his planned visit to Colombia, suspended after the
September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, Secretary Powell
also announced that the United States had put the AUC on the administration's
list of terrorist groups, along with the FARC-EP and UC-ELN, allowing U.S.
officials to suspend the U.S.-based accounts of people who contributed to the
group.
Between 1998 and 2001, eleven Colombian Army units were vetted for human rights
problems and approved to receive U.S. security assistance. In addition, all CNP
counternarcotics units, the Colombian Air Force, the Colombian Navy, and the
Colombian Marines were cleared to receive U.S. assistance.
Although human rights continued to be cited as an important policy concern, the
U.S. violated the spirit of its own laws and in some cases downplayed evidence
of ties between the Colombian armed forces and paramilitary groups in order to
continue funding abusive units. Compelling evidence emerged, in particular, of
ties between paramilitaries and Colombian military units deployed in the U.S.
antinarcotics campaign in southern Colombia, showing that U.S.-vetted, -funded,
and -trained troops were mixing freely with units that maintained close ties
with paramilitaries.
This occurred in the case of the First and Second Counternarcotics Battalions.
On their first joint deployment in December 2000, these battalions depended
heavily on the army's Twenty-Fourth Brigade for support and logistical
assistance, particularly with regard to intelligence, civic-military outreach,
and psychological operations. Yet there was abundant and credible evidence to
show that the Twenty-Fourth Brigade regularly worked with and supported
paramilitary groups in the department of Putumayo. Indeed, the Twenty-Fourth
Brigade hosted counternarcotics battalion troops at its facilities in La
Hormiga--a town where, according to witnesses, paramilitaries and Colombian
Army troops were indistinguishable.
The application of human rights conditions proved inconsistent if a unit was
considered key to U.S. strategy, with embassy officials openly acknowledging
that they applied conditions in a subjective manner. In certain cases, if a
unit was considered important enough to drug war objectives, the U.S.
circumvented its own human rights law to continue funding and training it.
One example was Combat Air Command No. 1 (Comando Aéreo de Combate No. 1), part of the Colombian Air Force. The State
Department did not suspend this unit from receiving security assistance despite
credible evidence that one of its helicopter crews committed a serious
violation in the village of Santo Domingo, near Arauca, in 1998, by bombing a
house where civilians had taken shelter. At the time of this writing, almost
three years after the incident, no military personnel had been effectively
investigated or disciplined for an attack that killed seven children and eleven
adults. Throughout, Combat Air Command No. 1 continued to be authorized to
receive U.S. security assistance and training.
A report prepared by the U.S. General Accounting Office concluded that farmers
displaced by the U.S.-funded anti-drug campaign received little assistance
beyond the first ninety days of their displacement. Under the U.S. aid plan,
U.S. $37 million was set aside to deal with displaced persons, particularly
those affected by eradication efforts in the south of Colombia.
The United States took some positive steps with regard to human rights in
Colombia. The foreign aid bill approved by the U.S. Congress for FY 2002 contained
strong human rights conditions on security assistance with no waiver authority,
a clear improvement over previous legislation. The U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) made grants to seven human rights groups in
Colombia totaling over $575,000. USAID also contributed assistance to 176,000
people forcibly displaced by aerial eradication and political violence and
supported a $2.5 million program for ex-combatant children. However, proposed
aid for the attorney general's Human Rights Unit was diverted to buy expensive
equipment that only marginally benefited this office, which continued to face
serious problems in getting prosecutors to the sites of crimes and providing
them with even minimal protection. In 2000 and the first three months of
2001--a fifteen-month period--the attorney general's Human Rights Unit and
advisers from the Internal Affairs agency received only U.S. $65,763 from
USAID. That worked out to less than the average amount of U.S. military
assistance spent in Colombia in two hours of a single day.
The annual country report on human rights issued by the State Department accurately reflected the situation in Colombia, giving a detailed and grim picture of abuses. As importantly, U.S. Amb. Anne Patterson began a long-overdue policy of speaking out on the human rights situation and expressing concern over specific cases. Her timely telephone call to the army commander of a Barrancabermeja battalion in December 2000 was a critical factor in spurring the Colombian authorities to act to address the paramilitary advance. She also publicly supported the UNHCHR in Colombia, speaking out on the importance of their work at critical moments.
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